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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent mischaracterizes the District Court's Ruling.
First, the District Court did not interpret the contested
statute as procedural.

The District Court's Ruling was

squarely based upon the interpretation that Utah Code Ann,
§30-1-4.5, the Common Law Marriage statute, divested the
district court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Second, the Respondent takes excessive editorial license
the District Court's Ruling as justification for noncompliance with the applicable rules of civil procedure.
Third, the Respondent can't reconcile his analysis, the
lower court's ruling herein, the prior decision of Bunch v.
Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918,(Utah Ct. App., 1995) with the Utah
Supreme Court case of Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah,
1994).
Fourth, the Respondent did not file a cross appeal and
therefore can not attack the lower court's ruling against
Mr. Snarr's attorney's fees.

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT TAKES INAPPROPRIATE LICENSE WITH THE DISTRICT
COURT'S RULING,
SUBPOINT A
RESPONDENT MISCHARACTERIZES HIS MOTION TO DISMISS AS
PROCEDURAL.
In summary Mr. Snarr claims he may ignore the applicable
rules of civil procedure due to the lower court's
interpretation that Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 as a separate
and superceding procedural mechanism.

This is a

misstatement of the lower court's ruling.
Respondent's Brief at p. 13, infers Mr. Snarr was
granted leave to amend his answer.

Mr. Snarr fails to cite

the record in support of that proposition.

In fact, no such

relief was granted by either the Commissioner nor the
District Judge.

The District Judge's ruling is based

entirely upon Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 and Bunch V.
F.nglehorn 906 P.2d 918, (Utah Ct. App., 1995)
The ruling and the Order Dismissing the Petition for
Divorce is squarely based upon the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction.

Therefore, whether or not Mr. Snarr properly
2

pled the statute, the district was void of jurisdiction
pursuant to Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918,(Utah Ct. App.,
1995). (Order Dismissing Action, R. 229; District Court
Ruling February 11, 1999, Tr.21, L.3-9;

££L£,

Petitioner's

Addendum, p. 28, 29)
Respondent further embellishes the lower court's
acquiescence in the matter by inappropriately omitting the
full procedural history of the case.

Respondent

conveniently forgets that this matter was originally set for
trial on May 27, 1998.

That date was reset by the trial

court on its own motion six (6) days prior to trial. Mr.
Snarr omits that he did not file his motion to dismiss 30
days prior to the first trial date as required by Rule 4501(3)(g), Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
Similarly, Mr. Snarr would misled his audience to
believe his catch all Rule 12(b)(6), U.R.Civ,P.f motion
included his procedural analysis of the applicable statute.
In fact, Mr. Snarr's eleventh hour motion on the second
trial date, was based upon subject matter jurisdiction, Utah
Rules of civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(1). (R.124)

It is

disingenuous to claim Mr. Snarr had always intended his only
3

affirmative defense to be all inclusive for statute of
limitations, subject matter jurisdiction or a specific
statute of procedure defending against a common law
marriage.
Assuming Mr. Snarr insists that Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5
is a procedural statute, he has yet to assert a justifiable
reason for not pleading the statute as an affirmative
defense.

Although Mr. Snarr will not concede or label the

statute as one of limitations, Mr. Snarr's brief argues the
statute is a procedural mechanism.(Appellee7s Brief, p.24)
Assuming the lower court adopted that analysis, Mr.
Snarr is not permitted to ignore Rule 9, U.R.Civ.P.

Rule 9

governs special pleadings, statute of limitations (Rule
9(h)), conditions precedent (Rule 9(c)), and private
statutes (Rule 9(i)).

In arguendo, if Mr. Snarr's all

inclusive Rule 12(b)(6) affirmative defense include the Rule
9 requirements, it does not obviate the time requirements of
Rule 6, U.R.Civ.P.f and Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration for his dispositive motion.
Only one rationalization exists for the lower court's
ruling and the time requirements of the rules of procedure.
4

Namely, the trial court determine, and did in fact find,
that the issue at hand was subject matter jurisdiction and
capable of being raised at any time, including sua sponte.
Mr. Snarr's rationalization that the contested statute is
procedure or he otherwise specifically pled the statute is
an after the fact contrivance.
If Mr. Snarr had the same contemporaneous analysis when
he filed his answer, as alleged in his brief, it is
inexcusable to file a dispositive motion on the day of
trial.

That excuse wears thinner by adding the fact that

the trial was the second such setting and nothing had been
filed prior to the first trial date in May, 1998.
Finally, Mr. Snarr alleges that Petitioner's counsel
waived any timeliness objection by requesting permission to
file a responsive brief.

On the day of trial, August 12,

1998, Petitioner made the following statement and the outset
of oral argument.
THE COURT...I had not received a copy of the Motion or
seen the original or was otherwise aware of it. I
believe Mr. Cutler was aware of the motion and he also
indicated he was going to be relying on the case of
Hansen v. Hansen 342 Utah Advanced Reports 25 filed May
7, 1998. I have and Counsel graciously supplied me with
a copy of each of these cases which I have now read. At
5

that time I asked Mr. Cutler if he was prepared to argue
the motion and he indicated that he was. I do not have
a memorandum filed in opposition for this motion, but I
understand that the parties are ready to argue this
motion nonetheless. Is that correct, counsel, have I
stated everything — have I summarized everything that we
talked about in chambers and done so accurately?
MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. CUTLER: That is accurate, Your Honor. I would just
supplement that obviously this motion (sic) be brought
at the end of my case in chief and I am prepared to
argue that. I am not waiving the timeliness issue or
what other information I might have been able to provide
you had I had an opportunity to provide a memoranda.
THE COURT: Well, a motion is jurisdictional. A
jurisdictional claim can be raised at any time. The
motion is not timely in the sense that it should have
been filed more than 30 days prior to the day of trial
and I prepared, if you are requesting it, to give you a
continuance to file a written response to this motion
and otherwise prepared adequately to respond to it, but
if you do not wish to have a continuance, then I will
deem that as not a valid waiver, you, I believe that you
have waived your right to claim additional time to
respond to it.
MR. CUTLER: I am not requesting a continuance, Your
Honor. I was simply, because Mr. Cook claims this is a
jurisdictional motion we dispute that but we are
prepared to argue it. (August 12, 1998 Transcript of
Argument, Tr.3-4; See Petitioner's Addendum, p.32)
The issue of waiver is further discussed between counsel
and the trial court later during oral argument.
THE COURT: ...Mr. Cutler, maybe I didn't understand what
you said you were not waiving. Was(sic) it is that you
are not waiving?
MR. CUTLER: Your Honor, the right to respond, if
necessary to address certainly the constitutional issue
which should be (inaudible) if we get to that point, but
6

I am prepare to argue about this issue of waiver and
whether or not the four corners of the pleadings they
stand on their own and my point to the court is simply
their prayer for relief was giving a decree of divorce
and now that's changed 48 hours previously without any
other prior filed(sic).
THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that this does require
additional briefing. I am concerned about, actually the
constitutional issue seems to be addressed, well, its
not, yes or no, addressed by the Court of Appeals. It
[Englehorn opinion] indicates at the trial court, the
issue is not preserved in the trial court and therefore
it wasn't specifically addressed but in the footnote
they indicated that a narrow area in which they had
constitutional concerns and I don't, you know, whether
you can infer that there is some other constitutional
concern they have about the statute as it was presented
on the facts is open to some question, I suppose...
So I need some additional briefing with regard to these
various aspects of the motion. I'd also note that
although a jurisdictional issue, assuming it is
jurisdictional issue can be raised at any time, it is
under the Code of Judicial Administration, motions must
be filed at least 30 days prior to trial. This was
filed two days prior to trial. That made all of this
argument much more difficult and the issues were ripe
months ago for the filing of this motion.
Having said all that, I am going to take this
motion under advisement. I may even require that
although I have considered this motion at this time, I
may require that this first be submitted to the
commissioner as required by the Code of Judicial
Administration and reargue it. So, the only question
now is whether to proceed with the trial or whether to
continue the trial and the parties are ready to proceed
to trial is that correct?
MR. CUTLER:
Yes, Your Honor.
MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor.

7

Immediately thereafter a conference in chambers and on
the record, occurred.
THE COURT: All right. We are on the record in the
matter of Snarr v. Snarr. The record should reflect the
Court is in session in chambers. The parties are not
present. Counsel came in and we've had a brief
discussion. We're making a record of that discussion
now. Mr. Cutler, came in and indicated that he felt
that it was appropriate for him to be given the time to
do a full briefing of the issues that were raised by
this motion today and therefore, albeit reluctantly, is
requesting a continuance of the trial and reluctantly it
appears to me based upon the fact that the parties were
ready for trial, the trial had to be continued once
before and I presume and infer from all of this that
they are at least Ms. Snarr is anxious to proceed to the
trial. The respondent is not objecting to this given
that it was respondent who filed the motion just two
days before the trial.
Have I summarized this fairly accurate.
MR. CUTLER: That's accurate, Your Honor.
MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Accurately? And the issues that need
to be briefed are the constitutionality of the statute
as applied to the facts in this case and also the issue
of whether by virtue of the pleadings or other conduct
of the parties in the record known to counsel there has
been a concession by respondent that there was a common
law marriage, not just to an element or even a couple of
elements, but whether there has been a concession as to
whether there is a common law marriage. And as to this,
I would expect this really to take the form, it's more
raised in the matter of a Motion for Summary - - or at
least the response today challenges by looking to the
pleadings, is claiming that reasonable inferences drawn
from the answer and complain when read in conjunction
with one another and the prayer suggests that there was
a concession to the issue of whether there was common
law marriage and that the respondent was focusing on the
8

terms of a divorce decree as opposed to contesting the
existence of a common law marriage. Is that all clear?
So I want that fully briefed....
So, based upon all of this, and I am reluctant to
do it too, because I know the parties were prepared to
go to trial. I certainly was prepared to hear the
trial. But the issues are of vital importance it seems
to be to both parties and it involves an attack on the
constitutionality of the statute. So, given the high
stakes involved, the length of the relationship that we
are talking about here I think that this needs full and
careful deliberation and this process will accommodate
that and I don't see a way of accommodating that goal
without striking the trial and proceeding in this
fashion. (August 12, 1998, Tr.15-20; See Petitioner's
Addendum, p.32)
A reasonable interpretation of the argument and colloquy
between counsel and district judge results in the following
interpretation.

First, everyone was ready for trial.

Second, but for the last minute motion the trial would have
proceeded.

Third, the trial court was also concerned why

such a motion would not have been filed prior to the first
trial date and so late in reference to the second trial
date.
Fourth, the trial court was clearly conflicted with two
issues, (a) Mr. Snarr's waiving his affirmative defense
under the Common Law Marriage statute (Tr.19,L.5-13) and (b)
the importance of the constitutional challenge (Tr. 20, L.7-
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17).

Mr. Snarr's assertions that his motion was simply a

procedural process belies the record.
Fifth, the only consistent reconciliation of the trial
court's comments and the trial court's ruling establishes
the issue as a subject matter jurisdiction question.
Otherwise, the trial court could not have overlooked the
extreme tardiness in filing a procedural motion as claimed
by Mr. Snarr.
SUBPOINT B
RESPONDENT INAPPROPRIATELY CLAIMS PETITIONER'S REQUEST TO
FILE A RESPONSIVE BRIEF CURES MR. SNARR'S UNTIMELY MOTION.
Mr. Snarr asserts his procedural motion and any defect
in notice is cured by the trial court wanting additional
briefing.

Mr. Snarr further asserts that Petitioner waived

any timeliness objection she had by agreeing to more
briefing.

As the trial court noted during oral argument in

August, 1998,
A

...I'd also note that although a jurisdictional issue,
assuming it is jurisdictional issue can be raised at any
time, it is under the Code of Judicial Administration,
motions must be filed at least 30 days prior to trial.
This was filed two days prior to trial. That made all
of this argument much more difficult and the issues were
ripe months ago for the filing of this motion.'(August
12, 1998 Trial date, Tr.l7,L.3-9, See Petitioner's
10

Addendum, p. 32)
The rules of civil procedure are not simply time clocks
that deactivate upon the filing of a brief.

The purpose is

to present an orderly process to deal with dispositive
motions.

Therefore without some further justification, Mr.

Snarr is hard pressed to present a compelling argument in
support of an eleventh hour filing.

As to date the

following arguments have been presented.
First, his motion is based in his all inclusive Rule
12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.

However, his

August 12, 1998 motion was based upon Rule 12(b)(1), subject
matter jurisdiction.(R.124)

Mr. Snarr apparently overlook

Rule 12(h), U.R.Civ.P. *A party waives all defenses and
objections which he does not present by either motion as
hereinbefore provided, (Rule 6(d), five day notice; Rule 4501(3)(g), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 30 days
prior to trial) or if he has made no motion, in his
answer..."
Second, Mr. Snarr claimed his ^procedural' motion to
dismiss is not waived if the responding party needs more
time for briefing.

In sum, Mr. Snarr's procedural motion
11

sat in limbo for 13 months after it was ripe, Mr. Snarr did
not conduct any discovery regarding the elements of a common
law marriage as alleged in Appellee's brief.

In fact, he

filed all the traditional arguments against Mrs. Snarr's
alimony motion just 30 days prior to the first trial
date. (JS£L£/ Respondent's Affidavits to Petitioner's Order to
Show Cause. R.110)
It is disingenuous to claim the elements of common law
marriage are now in issue four months after the close of the
pleadings.

Mr. Snarr's defenses were available to him at

the first Order to Show Cause for alimony in September,
1997, and available prior to two separate pre-trial hearings
before the Commissioner and the assigned trial judge,
(November, 1997 and January, 1998 respectively) and most
recently as a defense to the last Order to Show Cause in
April, 1998.
If the elements and defenses of a common law marriage
were honestly contemplated in Mr. Snarr's original answer,
he waived the same by not filing the appropriate dispositive
motion in a timely manner prior to the May, 1998 trial date.

12

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE MATTER IS DISMISSED FOR
WANT OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION CONTRADICTS WHYTE V,
BLAIRf 885 P.2D 791 (UTAH, 1994).
The very essence of Mr. Snarr's claim is Bunch v.
Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918,(Utah Ct. App., 1995) divests the
district court of subject matter jurisdiction after one
year.

Both Mr. Snarr's contention and the trial court's

ruling herein, are formulated upon this Court's opinion in
Englehorn, id.
In that matter, this Court upheld the trial court's
dismissal.

However, in Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah,

1994) the Utah Supreme Court's analysis of the Common Law
Marriage statute can not be reconciled with Mr. Snarr's
assertions.
In Whyte, id. the Utah Supreme Court was reviewing a
district court's dismissal of a claim by an injured
automobile passenger against an insurance company.

In

summary, Mr. Whyte was a passenger in Mr. Blair's automobile
when it collided with another vehicle. Mr. Blair was
uninsured.
At the time of the accident, Mr. Whyte had been living
13

with Linda Mitchell whom had an uninsured motorist policy
for herself and family members. Mr. Whyte sued his "livein' s" insurance company, American States, to cover him as a
family member.

Mr. Whyte and his partner had lived together

for three years prior to the accident in 1991.
The district court refused to enter a nunc pro tunc
order and dismissed the action against the insurance company
finding that without a court or administrative order in
place at the time of the automobile collision, no marriage
existed.
The Utah Supreme Court in a unanimous decision made an
extension dissection of the differences between a nunc pro
tunc remedy and an action to solemnize a relationship prior
to a date in question.

In summary, the Utah Supreme Court

found the trial court erred and that the parties were
entitled to remand for the purpose of determining the
factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5.
However, in two separate statements, the Utah Supreme
Court is apparently not troubled by Mr. Snarr's claimed
jurisdictional defenses.

In dicta, the Court reviewed other

14

states common law marriage cases and made the following
comment.
Under the common law and under state statutes like
Utah's that adopt common law principles, the effect of a
court order has always been to formally recognize a
lawful marriage that began before the order was entered
and existed from that time until terminated, most often
by death of one spouse. Id. at 795 (Emphasis Added)
The Utah Supreme Court also reviewed the legislative
history of Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5.

Despite Mr. Snarr's

speculation in his brief regarding the legislative purpose,
the unanimous court made following observations.
Although the legislative summary does not expressly
declare the reasons the Legislature adopted Utah Code Ann.
§30-1-4.5 and changed what had been basic Utah marriage law,
the Legislature's purpose is clear: A marriage under the
statute is valid from the time it is entered. If such a
marriage were valid only from the time of the entry of a
formal order, then that marriage would not differ from
traditional marriages and the adoption of a common law form
of marriage would serve no purpose. The only advantage of a
common law marriage is to give formal recognition to
marriages informally entered into the past, id. 794 (See,
Legislative Summary S.B. 156, Petitioner's Addendum, p. 35)
The Utah Supreme Court then cites with approval several
sister state Supreme Court decisions upholding the principle
that a formal order is likely to be entered after the fact.
However, the Utah Supreme Court leaves without comment
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
15

Although the

underlying litigation in Whyte was not completed within one
year of the stated event, neither the insurance company nor
the Court, sua sponte, raised subject matter jurisdiction as
a deterrent to plaintiff's remedy.
In summary, Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 is unique in
construction.

A review of similar statutes in other states

reveals no similar comparison regarding the Mrop-dead'
effect of the one year restriction.

Petitioner can not

locate any other Utah State statute with any similar effect.
The routine and orderly presentation of litigation requires
commencement of a legal action within a specified time
period.

Nothing is comparable to Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5

which requires completion of litigation as a precondition
for a remedy.
POINT III
APPELLEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES.
In Appellee's Brief, Mr. Snarr asserts entitlement to
attorney's fees from the lower court.

Mr. Snarr has again

waived an issue by failing to file the appropriate pleading,
namely a Cross Appeal.
Although a party engaged in an appeal may seek the fees
16

for the appeal, Wallis v. Thomas, 632 P.2d 944 (Utah, 1991),
a party may not attack the lower court's ruling without
filing a cross appeal.

In Henretty v. Manti City Corp,, 791

P.2d 506 (Utah, 1990) the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the
predecessor Rule 4, Utah S. Ct. R., and mandated a cross
appeal to challenge a lower court's ruling on fees.
The Appellee is not entitled to fees under Rule 33, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. A simple review of Mr.
Snarr's actions in this matter is ample evidence that this
appeal is not a delaying tactic.

These parties remained

together as husband and wife in excess of 20 years. They
had two children together and continually held themselves
out as married.

But for Mr. Snarr raising this eleventh

hour issue, the matter would have been overlooked.

In fact,

it was Mr. Snarr who supposedly knew he had a valid defense
but did nothing with it for over 13 months (July, 1997
through August, 1998) .
Judge Stirba's observations during the August 12th trial
date most accurately describe the issues presented to her.
She stated in pertinent part,
...But the issues are of vital importance it seems to be
17

to both parties and it involves an attack on the
constitutionality of the statute. So, given the high
stakes involved, the length of the relationship that we
are talking about here I think that this needs full and
careful deliberation and this process will accommodate
that..." August 12, 1998 Trial, Tr. 20;£££, Petitioner's
Addendum, p. 32)
Appellee again raises last minute issues for the first
time in Appellee's Brief.

As in the lower court, Mr. Snarr

again fails to follow the appropriate procedure.

He could

have presented his claim for fees to this Court by first
filing a cross appeal, or file a motion for summary
disposition pursuant to Rule 10, Utah R. App. P.

The

repeated failure to properly comply only validates
Petitioner's complaints below.

The Appellee's eleventh hour

issues over fees obviates the rules of procedure and should
sustain Petitioner's appeal on the merits.
The appellant has previously requested attorney's fees
at the lower court and reasserts that request herein. Ms.
Snarr seeks the matter to be reversed and remanded for
determination of appropriate attorney's fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Snarr's technically permissive use of alternate
theories to support his last minute effort to disavow his
18

relationship with his wife of 20 plus years is noteworthy.
However, he can not have it both ways.

He last minute

motion violated Rule 6, 8(c), 9, and 12(h), U.R.Civ.P.
He then claims that the chaos created by his last minute
motion is cured by permitting the opposing party time to
respond.
Prejudice is not cured by mere timing.

Mr. Snarr

central thesis is a factual claim that although he lived
with Mrs. Snarr from 1980 through 1996, he did not consent
to a marital contract.

That factual issue was waived by the

four corners of the pleadings. Mr. Snarr never amended his
answer or deviated from his Prayer for Relief, namely,

y

...a

Decree of Divorce be entered in accordance with his Answer.'
(R.7)
Mr. Snarr alternatively argues he is entitled to wait 13
months before springing his theory that subject matter
jurisdiction prevents the trial court from hearing the case.
As discussed in Appellant's primary brief, the Utah Common
Law Marriage statute does not divest the district court of
jurisdiction.
No other statutory comparison exists.
19

To sustain the

statute's constitutionality, a proper interpretation is that
the action must be commenced within the one (1) year
restriction..

Otherwise, the irrational Mrop dead'

provision stopping all litigation after one year becomes
unsupportable.
Finally, the issues presented to the Utah Court of
Appeals for the first time are complex and have significant
impact.

These issues are based upon a legitimate disputes

of the facts, law and the procedure that Appellee prompted
before the lower court.

The Petitioner is entitled to

attorney's fees and costs on appeal. Mrs. Snarr further
requests the matter be remanded for trial and determination
of an award of attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this
matter.
Respectfully submitted this

vy^) day of December, 1999.

L. G.^CUTLER
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
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CFRTTFTCATF OF SFRVTCE

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, by first
class mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of
the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, on this < 2 ^ day of
December, 1999, to Stephen W. Cook, Attorney for Respondent,
at 323 South 600 East, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102.

21

ADDENDUM

22

ADDENDUM
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page #
Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah, 1994).

23

.

.

24

whyte v» Blair,
885 P.2d

791

(Utah,

1994)

James R. Whyte, Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Brent A. Blair, Glen L. Taylor, and American States
Insurance, Defendants and Appellees
No. 930555
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
885 P.2d 791, 251 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 1994 Utah LEXIS 76
November 2, 1994, Filed; As Corrected November 21, 1994
CASE STATUS:

Released for Publication November 28, 1994

Third District, Salt Lake County. The Honorable John A. Rokich.

COUNSEL
Brian S. King, Salt Lake City, for James Whyte.
Tim Dalton Dunn, Kevin D. Swenson, Salt Lake City, for
American States Insurance.
Michael J. Cooper, Salt Lake City, for Glen Taylor.
JUDGES
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, WE CONCUR: Michael D.
Zimmerman, Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Justice, Christine M.
Durham, Justice, Michael R. Murphy, District Judge, Russon,
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STEWART
OPINION

STEWART, Associate Chief Justice :
James R. Whyte appeals an order denying his motion for
summary judgment and dismissing American States Insurance. Tl
Whyte claimed that he was lawfully married to Linda Mitchell and
therefore was "covered" under her auto insurance policy issued by
American States Insurance as a member of her family, although
their marriage was not solemnized.
On September 5, 1991, Whyte was injured when the car he

was in, driven by Brent A. Blair, collided with a car driven by
Glen L. Taylor. Blair was uninsured.
At the time of the accident, Whyte had been living with
Linda Mitchell for three years. Mitchell had an uninsured
motorist policy in the amount of $ 50,000 with American States
Insurance that covered "family members." Mr. Whyte asserts that
at the time of the accident, he was a family member by marriage
to Ms. Mitchell. That marriage has never been solemnized.
However, in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1989), a
marriage that is not solemnized may still be valid. Section
30-1-4.5 states:
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative
order establishes that it arises out of a contract between two
consenting parties who:

(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized
marriage under the provisions of this chapter;

(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and
obligations; and

(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.

(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage
under this section must occur during the relationship described
in Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination
of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under
this section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved
under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases.
The district court ruled (1) that a marriage is not valid
under Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 until a court or administrative
order is entered, and (2) that there was not a sufficient showing
of "good cause" to enter a nunc pro tunc order. Consequently, the
court held that Mr. Whyte and M s . Mitchell were not married at
the time of the accident and Mr. Whyte was not covered by Ms.

Mitchell's policy with American States Insurance.
Mr. Whyte argues that Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 does not
preclude a court order establishing that he was married to Ms.
Mitchell at the time of the accident and that there is no
statutory requirement that he demonstrate "good cause" for such
an order to be entered. We agree.
To frame the issue, we must make an important distinction.
An order entered today may establish that a marriage was
contracted and in existence sometime in the past. This is
different from a nunc pro tunc order, which is entered by a court
but by operation of law is treated as if it were legally entered
at a prior time. Entry of a nunc pro tunc order ordinarily
requires a showing of good cause. An order that simply
adjudicates a prior judicial fact or status ordinarily requires
no such showing. The issue is whether Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5
permits an order to establish that a lawful marriage existed
prior to the entry of the order. In essence, the issue is whether
that provision establishes "common law marriage" as a lawful form
of marriage.
Prior to 1987, Utah never recognized common law marriages;
indeed, such marriages were expressly prohibited. Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-1-2(3) (1984) (repealed by § 30-1-4.5 (1987)); In re Vetas'
Estate, 110 Utah 187, 190, 170 P.2d 183, 184 (1946); see also
Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 504, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
We begin with the plain language of the statute. See
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989). Section
30-1-4.5 clearly directs that a court or administrative order may
establish that a marriage was previously entered into and that it
was lawful as of that time. Subsection (2) states that the court
or administrative order must be entered "within one year
following the termination of that relationship." An order that
recognizes a marriage and is entered after the relationship has
terminated must, by necessity, recognize that the marriage
existed before the order was entered. Thus, the order merely
recognizes that a woman and a man have by their prior consent and
conduct entered into a marital relationship, although it was not
theretofore formally solemnized or otherwise legally recognized.
Section 30-1-4.5 declares that such a marriage is valid despite
not having been solemnized. Thus, if the elements of § 30-1-4.5
subsections (1)(a) through (e) are established, then a lawful
marriage may be found to have existed prior to the entry of the
order by a court or administrative body. State v. Johnson, 856
P.2d 1064, 1069 (Utah 1993). 12
The legislative history of section 30-1-4.5 clearly
indicates that it is a codification of common law marriage

principles. Office of Legislative Research & General Counsel,
Summary S.B. 156 Recognition of Common Law Marriages (1987). The
summary of Senate Bill 156 expressly refers to the bill as a
common law marriage provision. It states, "Once a common law
marriage has been found to exist by a court or administrative
order, it is treated as any other marriage for all purposes."
Although the legislative summary does not expressly
declare the reasons the Legislature adopted Utah Code Ann. §
30-1-4.5 and changed what had been basic Utah marriage law, the
Legislature's purpose is clear: A marriage under the statute is
valid from the time it is entered. If such a marriage were valid
only from the time of the entry of a formal order, then that
marriage would not differ from traditional marriages and the
adoption of a common law form of marriage would serve no purpose.
The only advantage of a common law marriage is to give formal
recognition to marriages informally entered into in the past.
Under the common law and under state statutes like Utahfs
that adopt common law principles, the effect of a court order has
always been to formally recognize a lawful marriage that began
before the order was entered and existed from that time until
terminated, most often upon the death of one spouse. See, e.g.,
Travers v. Remhardt, 205 U.S. 423, 432, 51 L. Ed. 865, 27 S. Ct.
563 (1907) (decedent's widow "was his lawful wife at the time of
his death and . . . had been his lawful wife for many years prior
thereto"); People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660, 667 (Colo. 1987) (en
banc); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Idaho 122, 645
P.2d 356, 362 (Idaho 1982); In re Estate of Hendrickson, 248 Kan.
72, 805 P.2d 20, 25 (Kan. 1991) ("a valLd common-law marriage
existed between" decedent and widow prior to his death and entry
of the court order); Hurley v. Hurley, 721 P.2d 1279, 1284 (Mont.
1986); In re Estate of Murnion, 212 Mont. 107, 686 P.2d 893, 900
(Mont. 1984). Another example of the principle is found in In re
Estate of Eliasen, 105 Idaho 234, 668 P.2d 110 (Idaho 1983).
There, a man and a woman consensually assumed marital obligations
and habitation in 1967 without solemnization. Later, in 1970,
they had a formal marriage ceremony. In a divorce decree, the
court ruled that the marriage began in 1967, not in 1970. Id. at
114.
It follows that the nunc pro tunc statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-49-1, is inapplicable and Whyte need not show "good cause"
for the court to enter an order recognizing his marriage,
assuming that the statutory prerequisites are complied with.
In determining whether a relationship satisfies the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (a) through (e),
numerous factors should be considered. No single factor is
determinative. See People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660, 665 (Colo.

1987) (en banc). Evidence of each element is essential.
Consenting parties must show cohabitation, assumption of marital
rights and duties, a general reputation as husband and wife,
capacity to marry, and capacity to give consent. Often these five
elements of section 30-1-4.5(1) (a) through (e) can be proved or
disproved with relative ease. However, whether the parties
consented to be married is often disputed. See, e.g. , State v.
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1069 (Utah 1993); Lucero, 747 P.2d at
665; Hurley v. Hurley, 721 P.2d 1279, 1284 (Mont. 1986).
The best evidence of marital consent is a written
agreement, signed by both parties, manifesting their consent.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Idaho 122, 645 P.2d
356, 361 (Idaho 1982). The testimony of others who were present
when the agreement to assume all marital responsibilities was
made could also be highly persuasive. Travers v. Reinhardt, 205
U.S. 423, 436, 51 L. Ed. 865, 27 S. Ct. 563 (1907); Metropolitan
Life, 645 P.2d at 361; In re Estate of Murnion, 212 Mont. 107,
686 P.2d 893, 908 (Mont. 1984) (Haswell, C.J., dissenting).
Despite the form of evidence used to show marital consent, what
must be shown by the party claiming the benefit of an
unsolemnized marriage is that at some point mutual consent was
given. 13 This has at times been expressed by the statement that
a common law marriage must take place immediately or not at all,
Murnion, 686 P.2d at 899, or alternatively, that a relationship
illicit in its inception is presumed to be illicit throughout the
period of cohabitation. Id. at 897.
Under the common law, the most customary proof of marital
consent was general reputation, cohabitation, and acknowledgment.
Travers, 205 U.S. at 437; Lucero, 747 P.2d at 665. Under Utah's
codification, evidence of general reputation, cohabitation, and
assumption of marital rights and duties would be evidence of
consent, but standing alone, would not be sufficient. See In re
Marriage of Winegard, 257 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 1977)
(cohabitation alone is insufficient). Section 30-1-4.5 requires
general reputation, cohabitation, and assumption of marital
obligations as separate elements in addition to consent. The
following nonexhaustive list suggests probative evidence that has
been used by other courts to establish consent: maintenance of
joint banking and credit accounts; purchase and joint ownership
of property; the use of the man's surname by the woman and/or the
children of the union; the filing of joint tax returns; speaking
of each other in the presence of third parties as being married;
and declaring the relationship in documents executed by them
while living together, such as deeds, wills, and other formal
instruments. Travers, 205 U.S. at 441; Lucero, 747 P.2d at 665;
Winegard, 257 N.W.2d at 616.
Care must be given to guard against fraudulent marriage

claims, Lucero, 747 P.2d at 664, especially where a declaration
of marriage would reap financial rewards for an alleged spouse.
When a reward is available, human nature may choose to strengthen
and augment, in retrospect, the consent to marry that was only
tentative before the reward became available. Murnion, 686 P.2d
at 909 (Haswell, C.J., dissenting). Because a court or an
administrative order will provide the same privileges to the
parties to a marriage under the statute as the privileges under a
formal marriage, the same duties must be imposed. A couple may
not enter and exit a marriage for simple financial convenience.
Where financial gain is at issue, acknowledgment of marital
consent by the woman and the man may be less persuasive if
contradictory evidence is presented. But if the acknowledgment is
uncontradicted or if it does not benefit the man or the woman but
rather some third party, then the acknowledgment may be more
persuasive.
The district court's order is reversed, and the case is
remanded to determine if a valid marriage existed prior to the
accident.
WE CONCUR:
Michael D. Zimmerman, Chief Justice
Richard C. Howe, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Michael R. Murphy, District Judge
Russon, Justice, having disqualified himself, does not
participate herein; Murphy, District Judge, sat.
OPINION FOOTNOTES
Tl Pursuant to a subsequent stipulation, the other parties
were also dismissed, making the judgment final.
12 Defendants argue that Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 504 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), and Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), are applicable. They are not. Each of those cases
considered the validity of a common law marriage in Utah prior to
1987. Because such marriages were prohibited prior to 1987, they
were not valid. By contrast, in the present case the relationship
that possibly establishes a common law marriage existed well
after 1987.
13 Although mutual consent is required, consent also may

be established by acquiescence. In a divorce proceeding, the
consent of the man to marry may be based on his objective words
and actions that led the woman to believe that he had consented
to marriage, despite later denying it. In re Marriage of
Winegard, 257 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 1977). This is consistent
with one purpose of section 30-1-4.5 to avoid "man in the house"
welfare problems. Office of Legislative Research & General
Counsel, Summary S.B. 156 Recognition of Common Law Marriages
(1987).
In contrast, strong evidence of consent, such as (1)
living together for 19 years, (2) having a child, (3) having a
general reputation as married, and (4) having the mother of one
of the partners living with them, was held insufficient to
establish consent where the woman refused the man's marriage
proposals on several occasions and some of their financial
affairs were handled separately. Maria v. Freitas, 73 Haw. 266,
832 P.2d 259, 262 (Haw. 1992).
In common law marriage cases, consent is the most
frequently litigated issue. States vary widely in its treatment.
Its development in Utah will necessarily proceed on a
case-by-case basis.
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